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13 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/P

SUBJECT

: Analysis of [] by []

The following comments are made to you regarding referenced analysis:

1. (Page 4): Without having checked the source production file, which I presume is available in EE/EE, I would say that Subject provided BOB with all significant information which came to his attention as a result of his position with Wismut. It must be remembered that we recruited Subject in the hopes of getting closer to the Soviet over-all AE procurement program in Germany. We were satisfied by the time he defected that the procurement program in question was not being handled through Wismut channels, but by a separate team of expeditors. I should point out that Subject did put the finger on the West German firm, Rohde and Schwarz, as the source of technical materials for Wismut. That the Russians were interested in the R & S firm seems to have been borne out by the recent high jinks in Munich as monitored and surveilled by ZIPPER. As far as reports on the operational handling of Subject during this period are concerned, we were mainly dependent on [] for these reports, and he was indeed lax in reporting full details.

2. (Page 5): During this period it was unfortunately the case that all too many incoming telephone calls from agents were bungled by duty officers who spoke little or no German. I find it quite likely that Subject's call on this occasion was so bungled.

3. (Page 7): This paragraph appears to be garbled. What happened to the best of my recollection, without having checked files, was that late in the evening, possibly 2200 or 2300 hours on 21 May 1950, Mueller, having tried all evening, finally succeeded in contacting the BOB case officer (I presume another telephone bungle had occurred). Mueller reported the call by Windpennig of 1830 hours; not having been able to reach us, I believe he went to the railroad station himself, although I may

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be mistaken; in any case, Windpennig had in the meantime again called Mueller and stated that the mistress would arrive the next morning, I think at 0700 hours. Thus there was no "exercise" on the part of BOB on 21 May—only the one on the morning of 22 May. We were able to put this picture together only afterwards when Subject had defected, although I certainly agree that we should have been suspicious of Windpennig's call from the outset. As I remember it from questioning Mueller, Windpennig had obviously invented some convincing cock and bull story in the second phone talk with Mueller to cover up the fact that the promised arrival on the evening of 21 May was phony.

4. (Page 8): It would be logical here to say that the Soviets presumably ~~thought~~ they had some degree of control over Subject.

5. (Page 8): This is purely conjecture. I know of similar instances where the agent prospect showed up merely in order to present a passionate plea that we not endanger his existence by continued attempts to contact him.

6. (Page 8): This merely amounts to saying that no one in East Germany in his right mind would work for the American Secret Service.

7. (Page 8): This reasoning is cogent. However, it should be remembered that the KIS required the services on very short notice of an individual who could ~~reasoning~~ ☐ ☐ I think the KIS may be just as prone as we are to use the man most available rather than the man most ideally suited to the job at hand.

8. (Page 8): The reasoning again is cogent, but it could be argued equally as well that the 500 BN were designed to ~~establish~~ control over Subject.

9. (Page 9): As I remember it, Subject lived outside the Karlshorst compound.

The above comments are not intended to belittle the possibility that Subject was under KIS control, but are only meant to keep our reasoning as close to the facts as possible.

☐ ☐
Chief, EE/Germany

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